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Abstract
In the modern quantum mechanics of cosmology observers are physical systems within the uni-
verse. They have no preferred role in the formulation of the theory nor in its predictions of third
person probabilities of what occurs. However, observers return to importance for the prediction of
first person probabilities for what we observe of the universe: What is most probable to be observed
is not necessarily what is most probable to occur. This essay reviews the basic framework for the
computation of first person probabilities in quantum cosmology starting with an analysis of very
simple models. It is shown that anthropic selection is automatic in this framework, because there is
no probability for us to observe what is where we cannot exist. First person probabilities generally
favor larger universes resulting from inflation where there are more places for us to be. In very large
universes it is probable that our observational situation is duplicated elsewhere. The calculation of
first person probabilities then requires a specification of whether our particular situation is assumed
to be typical of all the others. It is the combination of the model of the observational situation,
including this typicality assumption, and the third person theory which is tested by observation.
We conclude with a discussion of the first person predictions of cosmological observables such as
the cosmological constant and features of the primordial density fluctuations, in the no-boundary
quantum state of the universe and a dynamical theory in which these are allowed to vary.
∗ Based on a talk given by JH at the conference on the Philosophy of Cosmology, Tenerife, Spain, September
13-15, 2014.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The context for this essay is our universe — the whole closed system at all times containing
all the galaxies, stars, planets, biota, human societies, you, us, etc. There is nothing outside.
Two kinds of description of the universe can be distinguished:
Third person Descriptions: Descriptions of what the universe contains and how that
evolves — histories of what occurs.
First Person Descriptions: Descriptions of what we as the collection of human scientists
observe of the universe and use to test cosmological models.
The connection between these two kinds of description is the subject of this essay.
Quantum mechanical theories, and also classical ones, provide probabilities for different
descriptions. Correspondingly we can distinguish two different kinds of probabilities for any
observable O. Third person probabilities1
p(O) (1.1a)
for what values of O occur, and first person probabilities
p(1p)(O) (1.1b)
for what values of O we observe. The connection between these two kinds of probabilities
is the focus of this paper.
We will consider theories whose direct outputs are third person probabilities for histories
of what occurs in the universe. These include probabilities for the existence, evolution, and
functioning of any observing subsystems such as ourselves. Such subsystems play no special
role in formulating the theory — they are just one kind of subsystem among many. We refer
to such theories as ‘third person’ theories. Our most successful theories of cosmology are of
this kind. Classical physics in general is an example of a third person theory. In quantum
mechanics the extensions of the ideas of Everett [2] are third person theories, including those
used in this paper.
Observers do play a preferred role in calculating first person probabilities for observations
from third person ones. First person probabilities are third person ones conditioned on a
1 Following [1], in most of our previous work we have used ‘bottom-up probabilities’ and ‘top-down proba-
bilities’ for what are called here ‘third-person probabilities’ and ‘first person probabilities’.
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description of the observational situation. We shall use a variety of specific models to infer
the following general conclusions:
• What is most probable to occur is not necessarily what is most probable to be observed.
• Anthropic selection is an automatic consequence of first person probabilities.
• In universes large enough that we may be duplicated as physical subsystems elsewhere,
the description of the observational situation needed to compute first person probabil-
ities must also specify whether our particular situation is typical of all the others. It
is the combination of the model of the observer, including this typicality assumption,
and the third person theory which is tested by observation.
Observers and their observations are of central importance in the formulation of Copen-
hagen quantum mechanics. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems observers might
seem to have been demoted to the status of one subsystem among many. Indeed, they
have little effect on third person probabilities. But, as a consequences of the conclusions
above, the observer returns to importance in the calculation of first person probabilities for
observations by which the theory is used and tested. The observer strikes back.
Section II sketches the framework of the third person theory we will employ. Section III
discusses issues involved with first person probabilities. Section IV uses a model universe to
make more concrete the notions of first and third person descriptions of the universe and their
associated probabilities. Here we also describe the connection between third and first person
probabilities in a set of simple models. Section V describes how anthropic selection emerges
automatically as a feature of a certain class of first person probabilities. Section VI shows
how first person probabilities can sometimes be calculated directly from the theory with an
appropriate coarse graining. Section VII discusses the first person predictions of a number
of cosmological observables, such as the cosmological constant, in cosmological models based
on the the no-boundary quantum state of the universe and a dynamical landscape theory in
which these observables can take a range of values. In Section IX we try to set our results
in a more general view of physical theories.
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II. THIRD PERSON QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
This section briefly describes the elements of the theory that predicts third person proba-
bilities for histories of the universe which we use to reach the general conclusions mentioned
in the introduction2
We view the universe as a closed quantum mechanical system. It contains everything.
Galaxies, stars, planets, their biota, observers (including us!) etc are physical subsystems of
the universe subject to its quantum mechanical laws consistent with an Everettian point of
view [2]. The basic variables describing the universe and its contents are four-dimensional
cosmological spacetime geometries and four-dimensional configurations of matter fields. The
basic ingredients of the theory are an action I describing the dynamics of geometry coupled
to matter fields, and a quantum state of the universe Ψ. We denote the theory as (I,Ψ) .
The theory (I,Ψ) predicts third person probabilities for the individual members of sets of
alternative four-dimensional histories of the universe, including those histories that describe
its classical evolution. In this way (I,Ψ) can supply third person probabilities for such large
scale features of the universe as the amount of inflation, the approximate homogeneity and
isotropy, the pattern of cosmic microwave background (CMB) variations, and the formation
and evolution of the distribution of galaxies. In principle (I,Ψ) also supplies third person
probabilities for the accidents of biological evolution, the existence of observers like ourselves,
etc that are well beyond our power to compute or even estimate. For the examples in this
paper we will mostly use histories in which we are at a single moment of time. The time
approximately 14 Gyr after the big bang when our observations of the universe are made.
The theory (I,Ψ) is an example of what we will call a third person theory.
We test and utilize a theory not by its third person probabilities for what occurs, but by
its first person probabilities for what we observe. To compute first person probabilities we
first need to model the observational situation which we do next.
2 For more details the reader can consult the authors’ papers on which this essay is implicitly based and
through them find further references. For the quantum mechanics of closed systems see e.g. [3, 4]. For
quantum cosmology see e.g. [1, 5–9]. There is a little more detail about the no-boundary quantum state
of the universe [10] in Appendix B.
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III. FIRST PERSON QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
We begin by recalling the definition of a Hubble volume. We cannot see further in the
universe than the distance that light travels to us from the big bang, roughly 14Gyr ago.
A present volume of the same size as this distance is called a ‘Hubble volume’. In order
of magnitude the distance is c/H0 where H0 is the present Hubble constant. This size is
approximately 4000 Megaparsec or 1023 km. This is the largest scale over which we can
currently observe the universe.
As observers we are physical systems within the universe with only a probability to have
evolved in any one Hubble volume and a probability to be replicated in other Hubble vol-
umes if the universe has a very large number of them. An observer is a very special kind of
fluctuation D0 in the universe. It’s a fluctuation that is not singled out by quantum theory
from, say, density fluctuations that produced the CMB. But the probability for observers is
very difficult to compute. We will therefore employ a highly simplified model of observers:
All observers are alike (copies of us) and either exist in any Hubble volume with a third
person probability pE(D0) or do not exist with a probability 1− pE. Realistically the prob-
ability pE incorporates the probability of the accidents of several billion years of biological
evolution. Therefore, whatever its value is, it is very, very, very small. This is a very crude
model of complex observers, but better than many treatments where the probability that
observing systems evolved as part of the universe’s evolution is not considered at all.
Since both we and what we observe are part of the universe, first person probabilities
can be computed from the third person ones. If we are unique as physical systems within
the universe the first person probabilities are simply third person ones for what’s observed
conditioned on a description of the observational situation like the one given above, in terms
of probabilities pE for data D0. But if we are not unique then a more careful specification
of the observer is required which includes an assumption about which instance of D0 is
us, or more generally a probability distribution on the set of copies called a xerographic
distribution [11]. In this essay we will make the minimal assumption that we are equally
likely to be any of the incidences of D0 that the third person theory (I,Ψ) predicts. The
way to make other assumptions is discussed in Appendix A.
It’s a common intuition that the presence or absence of observers is unimportant for
the behavior of the universe on cosmological scales because observers are generally small
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subsystems. That intuition is correct for third person probabilities, but it is not correct for
first person ones. As physical systems we have only a tiny probability to exist in any one
Hubble volume. That is why third person probabilities are little affected by the presence
or absence of us. But this also means that we have a greater probability to live in a larger
universe than a smaller one, because in the larger there are more Hubble volumes in which to
be. Therefore, even if the third person probabilities favor smaller universes the first person
ones may favor larger ones. As we will show by example, what is most probable to occur
(third person) is not necessarily what is most probable to be observed (first person). It is
in this way that the observer returns to importance in cosmology.
IV. TOY MODEL UNIVERSES
This section derives the connection between third and first person probabilities for a very
simple class of models that provide elementary examples showing what is most probable to
be observed is not necessarily what is most probable to occur. In the trade these are called
‘box models’ [12].
A. Third person description and probabilities
Histories of the universe at one time are modeled as a collection of N boxes representing
Hubble volumes at that time. Each box has a color — say red or blue — modeling different
CMB maps. Each box may or may not contain an observer. A third person description
of a history specifies the number of boxes, their color, and whether each box contains an
observer or does not. A third person quantum theory specifies probabilities for these histories
— a probability for the number of boxes, a probability for the color of each box, and the
probability pE for whether an observer exists in each.
We illustrate this with the very simple set of single time histories [12] shown in Figure
1. At one time, only two possible histories of N and color are possible— N1 boxes all red
that occurs with a third person probability p1, and N2 boxes all blue that occurs with third
person probability p2 = 1 − p1. The probability that there is an observer in any box is pE
— the same for all boxes. The probability that there is no observer in a box is 1 − pE.
The third person probability of a history with a specific set of nE of Nk boxes occupied by
6
FIG. 1: Two histories of the simple box model universe described in the text. The boxes model
Hubble volumes. Their color models an observable like the CMB. An ‘E’ means that an observer
is in the box observing its color. A blank means there is no observer in the box. The third person
probabilities for these histories to occur are at the right.
observers is
pkp
nE
E (1− pE)Nk−nE (4.1)
where k = 1 (all red) or k = 2 (all blue). The complete set of histories consists of all red
and all blue histories, with different numbers of boxes in each, and the various possible ways
the boxes can be occupied by observers.
B. First Person Probabilities for Observation
We are one of the observers in one of the histories. We now ask for the theory’s prediction
for the first person probability that we observe red (WOR). To calculate that, assume that
in either history we are equally likely to be any one of the occurrences of E. Then the
probability that we observe red (WOR) is evidently the probability that we are in the
history with all red boxes (k = 1).
The probability that WOR is not the probability p1 that the history with all red boxes
occurs because that could happen with no boxes occupied by observers. Rather the prob-
ability for WOR is the probability that history k = 1 occurs with at least one observer.
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Denoting ‘at least one E’ by E≥ we have
p(E≥ in 1) = 1− p(no E in 1)
= 1− (1− pE)N1 . (4.2)
The normalized probability that we observe red (WOR) is then
p(1p)(WOR) =
p1[1− (1− pE)N1 ]∑
k pk[1− (1− pE)Nk ]
. (4.3a)
Similarly the probability that we observe blue is
p(1p)(WOB) =
p2[1− (1− pE)N2 ]∑
k pk[1− (1− pE)Nk ]
. (4.3b)
We now discuss important limiting cases.
Rare in all histories: When both pEN1  1 and pEN2  1 physical systems like us occur
only rarely in each of the two possible histories. Therefore we can assume that as a physical
subsystem we are unique in the universe. The probabilities for color observation (4.3) then
become
p(1p)(WOR) ≈ N1p1
N1p1 +N2p2
, (4.4a)
p(1p)(WOB) ≈ N2p2
N1p1 +N2p2
. (4.4b)
The first person probabilities for our observation of red or blue are the third person prob-
abilities of the all red and all blue histories weighted by the number of Hubble volumes in
each. This is called ‘volume weighting’. It favors larger universes where there are more
places for us to occur as has been extensively discussed in cosmology (e.g. [5, 13, 14]).
It’s important to emphasize that volume weighting is not an extra assumption in addition
to the theory of the histories. Rather it is a straightforward consequence of that theory in
models where we are rare in all histories.
In a third person description of this model blue is more likely to occur if p2 > p1. But
red is more likely to be observed if N1p1 > N2p2. Thus we have an elementary example of
what is most probable to be observed is not necessarily what is most likely to occur. That
is the return of the observer.
Other limiting cases are also interesting:
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Common in both histories: When both pEN1  1 and pEN2  1, copies of us as physical
systems are common in both histories. Then the probabilities (4.3) are
p(1p)(WOR) ≈ p1, (4.5a)
p(1p)(WOB) ≈ p2. (4.5b)
Thus when all histories in the ensemble are very large universes what is predicted to be
observed is also what is predicted to occur.
Rare in one history, common in the other: When, say, pEN1  1 but pEN2  1 copies of
us as physical systems are common in the all red history and rare in the blue one. We have
[1− (1− pE)N1 ] ≈ 1 and [1− (1− pE)N2 ] ≈ N2pE ≈ 0 since pE is very, very small. Then,
p(1p)(WOR) ≈ 1, (4.6a)
p(1p)(WOB) ≈ 0. (4.6b)
This is the case where the return of the observer has its most striking effect. The first
person probabilities select large histories over small ones even when the latter have larger
third person probabilities. We will see a concrete example of this in a more realistic model
in Section VIII.
C. A Crisis of Computability?
Box models divide the theory for predicting first person probabilities for what we observe
into two parts. First, there is the specification of the third person probabilities pk for the
large scale features of the models — the number of Hubble volumes and the color of each.
Second there are the third person probabilities for the occurrence of observers inside each
Hubble volume, summarized by the one number pE, which are used to describe and to
condition on the observational situation.
As we will see in Section VII, it is possible to make computationally tractable calculations
of pk in simple models. But the probability pE would naturally include the probability that
human observers evolved in a Hubble volume. To calculate this, or even estimate it, would
involve considering several billion years of the chance accidents of biological evolution. This
is well beyond our power to compute even assuming that we have a theory that is well
enough formulated to define the task.
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It is therefore fortunate that in all of the interesting limiting cases discussed above the
probability pE cancels out. Thus, it is in the regime of universes so small that we are unique,
or universes so large that we are common, that observations are easily and objectively
calculated.
V. ANTHROPIC SELECTION IS AUTOMATIC IN QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
Consider again the simple box model in Section IV B but suppose that the probability for
an observer to occupy a red box pRE is different from the probability p
B
E to occupy a blue box.
Suppose further that for some reason red is necessary for observers so that the probability
pBE to occupy a blue box is exceedingly small. It is then obvious, and easily worked out, that
the first person probability that we observe red is very near unity. This is a very simple
example of anthropic selection: The all red history is selected because observers do not exist
in the alternative.
The key point here is that anthropic selection is automatic. No additional assumptions
or principles were needed beyond the probabilities p1, p2, p
R
E and p
B
E which are all third
person probabilities following from the underlying theory. Anthropic selection emerges as
an intrinsic feature of the first person probabilities for the observer’s observations [15].
This is the case also in more general and more realistic cosmological models. As an
example consider an ensemble of single time histories which we take to be at the present age
of the universe t0 ≈ 14Gyr. Assume that the theory (I,Ψ) predicts third person probabilities
for what we may call a set of background histories each with the same number of Hubble
volumes but differing in the value of the cosmological constant Λ, which is assumed positive
and the same in all Hubble volumes of one history. The theory thus allows the cosmological
constant to vary. The histories can be labeled by the value of Λ and their third person
probabilities written p(Λ). As a fluctuation on these backgrounds the theory (I,Ψ) also
predicts a probability that in any Hubble volume there occur data D0 that describe our
observational situation (but not including any record we might have of the value of Λ).
These probabilities depend on Λ. The complete set of histories is thus labeled by the
backgrounds and which Hubble volumes in them are occupied by D0.
Assume that we are typical of the incidences of D0 in any one history. The first person
probability that we observe a value of Λ (WOΛ) is the third person probability for the history
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Λ conditioned on the existence of at least one instance of D0 [cf. (4.2) et seq.]. Using the
Bayes identity we have
p(1p)(WOΛ) ≡ p(Λ|D≥10 ) =
p(D≥10 |Λ)p(Λ)∑
Λ p(D
≥1
0 |Λ)p(Λ)
. (5.1)
For values of Λ for which p(D≥10 |Λ) is negligibly small the probability that we observe that
value will also be negligibly small. Hence anthropic selection of values of Λ that are consistent
with observers is automatic. This kind of argument assumes that the third person theory
allows Λ to vary over an anthropically allowed range — a range consistent with the evolution
of D0. We give an example of such a model in Section VIII. If however the theory determines
a unique value of Λ, then either that must be consistent with D≥10 or the theory is incorrect
(e.g. [21]).
Barrow and Tipler [16], and Weinberg [17] have argued that the observed value of the
cosmological constant could not be much larger than Λ ∼ 10−122 in Planck units, not far
from its observed value. Were Λ larger the universe would expand too rapidly for galaxies
to have formed by the present age t0 ∼ 14 Gyr and human observers would not be here. In
our scheme the probability p(D≥10 |Λ) would be near zero.
This kind of argument is an example of what one could call traditional anthropic reason-
ing. In this, the anthropically allowed range of values of an observable like Λ is determined
from classical arguments like those involving galaxy formation mentioned above. It is then
assumed that there is some unknown mechanism for Λ to vary over this range. In the ab-
sence of a specific model of this mechanism a uniform distribution over the range is often
assumed and the most probable Λ predicted on the basis of purely anthropic arguments. Im-
pressively detailed calculations were carried out in this way with mixed results, e.g [19]. But
this program suffers from several uncertainties. For example, different results are obtained
if different combinations of constants were assumed to vary [20]. In addition, traditional
anthropic reasoning is not part of any theoretical framework. Rather anthropic selection
arises from an additional assumption or ‘principle’.
The chief difference with anthropic selection in quantum cosmology is that 1) there the
theory (I,Ψ) provides a mechanism for what constants vary and how they vary, 2) the
observer is a physical subsystem with a certain probability predicted by the theory to evolve
in any Hubble volume and 3) anthropic selection emerges automatically as a property of
the first person probabilities by which we use and test the theory. To summarize, anthropic
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selection in quantum cosmology:
• Is not a choice.
• Does not require invoking some ‘anthropic principle’.
• Does not change the objective nature of the underlying third person theory.
• Does require a typicality assumption if there is a chance we are replicated.
The observer is important for first person probabilities for observations through anthropic
selection. In Section VIII 3 we will describe a more precise calculation of p(1p)(WOΛ) in
which the probabilities p(Λ) in (5.1) are obtained from a concrete model of the universe’s
quantum state Ψ in combination with a dynamical theory I in which Λ can vary.
VI. A REMARK ON COARSE GRAINING
Our observations of the universe extend at most over a Hubble volume. But this may
only be a tiny region in a vastly larger inflationary universes of the kind contemplated in
contemporary cosmology. Indeed, some calculations [24] suggest that the universe typically
becomes spatially infinite as a consequence of eternal inflation. Much of the third-person
information about what occurs in the universe on very large scales is irrelevant for the first
person predictions for our observations in our Hubble volume, and perhaps not even well
defined. In this section we illustrate how, in certain models, first person probabilities for
our observations can be calculated directly using coarse grainings that ignore most of the
structure outside our Hubble volume. Coarse graining is not an ad hoc assumption. It
is central and inevitable in quantum mechanics, statistical physics, complexity, and many
other areas of science (e.g. [28]).
We illustrate how coarse graining works with a simple box model of the kind used in
Section IV. Consider a universe with an infinite set of boxes as illustrated in Figure 2.
Each box has a color. This is either yellow with probability pY or green with probability
pG = 1 − pY . There is a probability pE for an observer to be in any box observing its
color. Thus all the boxes are statistically identical. In this sense this universe has a discrete
translation symmetry.
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FIG. 2: Fine and coarse-grained histories of a box model discussed in the text. The boxes model
Hubble volumes. Their color models an observable like the CMB in this case either yellow or green.
An ‘E’ means that an observer is in the box observing its color. The top history is fine grained
with a color and E or not E in every box. The bottom history is coarse grained. The possibilities
have been summed over for every box except one —- our box. That enables a straightforward
calculation of the first person probability that we see one color or the other. The details outside
our box are irrelevant for this.
Now we ask for the first person probability that we observe yellow. The answer is obvious.
We are in one box. All the boxes are statistically the same. The first person probability
p(1p)(Y ) for observing yellow is the same as the probability that any of the boxes is yellow,
viz.
p(1p)(Y ) = pY . (6.1)
Although obvious, it is instructive to see how this result follows from our general framework
through coarse graining starting from third person probabilities. A fine grained history
would specify the color (Y,G) of each box, and whether there exists an observer in it or not
(E, E¯) (top in Figure 2). The third person probability for one particular history having nY
yellow boxes, nG green boxes, nE boxes with observers, and nE¯ without, is
(pY )
nY (1− pY )nG(pE)nE(1− pE)nE¯ . (6.2)
But these probabilities tend to zero in a universe with an infinite number of boxes. The
probabilities for these fine-grained histories are not well defined.
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Finite probabilities can be obtained by coarse graining. That is, they can be obtained by
summing (6.2) over what’s irrelevant for our observations. To get first person probabilities
for our observations we can coarse grain over the alternatives in every box but ours. That
means sum the probabilities (6.2) over the alternatives (Y,G) and (E, E¯) giving a factor of
unity for every box but ours (bottom in Figure 2). That gives the first person probabilities.
This result generalizes straightforwardly to any finite number of kinds (colors) of Hubble
volumes, to models where the probabilities pE depend on the color, and to more than one
configuration (history) of boxes with third person probabilities like the p(k) of Section IV A.
In Section VIII we review an example of coarse graining used in realistic cosmology (see also
[9]).
To summarize, in infinite or just very large universes focusing on our observations in
our Hubble volume motivates coarse grainings that directly lead to well defined first per-
son probabilities for observations. It is an intriguing open question whether such a local
framework for prediction can be achieved more generally in quantum cosmology. Such a
framework would truly return the observer to importance.
VII. INFLATION IN QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
We now turn from illustrative but artificial toy models to more realistic cosmological
models. In this and the next section we consider two examples in which the return of
the observer is important — where the probabilities for what we observe are significantly
different from the probabilities for what occurs.
The two examples share a common theoretical framework (I,Ψ) . For the dynamics we
assume a spatially closed cosmological spacetime metric g coupled to a number of scalar
fields ~φ. The dynamics is specified by a (Euclidean) action I[g, ~φ] consisting of the action
for general relativity plus the an action for the scalar fields ~φ coupled to the metric g. For
the state Ψ we assume the no-boundary wave function of the universe (NBWF) [10]. This
is the natural analog of the notion of ‘ground state’ for closed cosmologies.
Many of our large scale observations are of properties of our universe’s classical history.
The rate of the universe’s expansion and the distribution of galaxies in our Hubble volume
are examples. A history of the universe behaves classically when the quantum probability
is high that it exhibits correlations in time governed by the Lorentzian Einstein equation
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and the classical field equations. The NBWF predicts an ensemble of alternative classical
histories along with third person probabilities for which history in the ensemble occurs. For
a little more on what the NBWF is, and how it predicts probabilities see Appendix B. For
much more see [6].
The first example is concerned with the classical cosmological histories predicted by the
NBWF when the matter consists of a single scalar field moving in a quadratic potential
V (φ) =
1
2
m2φ2 (7.1)
with m2  1 and zero cosmological constant. As in the rest of this paper we are using
Planck units where h¯ = 8piG = c = 1. Geometry and field are restricted to be homogeneous
and isotropic thus defining a minisuperspace model. Lorentz signatured homogeneous and
isotropic spacetime geometries can be described by metrics of the form
ds2 = −dt2 + a2(t)dΩ23. (7.2)
Here, dΩ23 is the metric on a unit round three-sphere. The time-dependence of the scale
factor a(t) describes how this closed universe expands and contracts. Standard closed FLRW
cosmological models have metrics of this form that satisfy the Einstein equation. The
homogeneous field is a function only of time, viz φ = φ(t). A quantum history of this
model universe is therefore specified by (a(t), φ(t)). Classical histories are described by a
pair (a(t), φ(t)) that obey the Einstein equation and the classical equations of motion for
the field.
As sketched in Appendix B the NBWF in this minisuperspace model predicts a one-
parameter ensemble of possible classical histories. These classical histories can be labeled
by a parameter φ0 that can be roughly thought of as the value of the scalar field from which
it starts to roll down to the bottom of the potential (7.1). By examining any one classical
a(t) we can find the number of efolds Ne of slow roll inflation it has. Remarkably all histories
in the NBWF classical ensemble turn out to have some inflation at early times [6]. Inflation
and the emergence of a classical universe in the NBWF are therefore profoundly connected
[6, 27].
Does our theory (I,Ψ) predict a significant probability for an extended period of inflation
in the early universe? As stated, this question is ambiguous. It could mean “Are the third-
person probabilities from (I,Ψ) high for classical histories with an early period of inflation?”
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But it could also mean “Are the first person probabilities high that the classical history we
observe has a significant period of early inflation?” We will display the answers to both
questions in our model and find that they are significantly different.
To evaluate the first person probabilities for the amount of inflation we can assume that
we are rare physical systems in any of the classical histories predicted by the NBWF. This is
because the number of Hubble volumes in all histories of the classical ensemble with matter
densities below the Planck density is much smaller than any realistic value of p−1E [7]. Hence
volume weighting (4.4) connects the first person probabilities for our observations with the
third person probabilities for what occurs.
The third person probabilities p = p(φ0) for the histories predicted by the NBWF are
given approximately by (B4)
p(φ0) ∝ exp[3pi/V (φ0)]. (7.3)
It turns out in this model that roughly Ne ≈ (3/2)φ20 starting at Ne ≈ 1. The third person
NBWF probabilities for classical histories (7.3) thus imply probabilities p(Ne) for the number
of efolds that occur, starting roughly at Ne ≈ 1,
p(Ne) ∝ exp
(
9pi
m2Ne
)
. (7.4)
Third person probabilities are therefore much larger for a small number of efolds than for
the minimal number ∼ 60 required for agreement with observation as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The situation is much different for first person person probabilities for the amount of
inflation in our history — the one we observe. Since it is assumed that we are rare, the first
person probabilities are the volume weighted third person probabilities as in (4.4). During
a period of inflation the volume of the universe expands by a factor exp(3Ne). The first
person probabilities are then approximately
p(1p)(Ne) ∝ exp
(
3Ne +
9pi
m2Ne
)
. (7.5)
Thus the NBWF predicts a significant probability for us to find ourselves in a universe
with a large number of efolds (Fig 3). This implies there is a significant probability for us
to observe the consequences of inflation — approximate spatial flatness, a scale invariant
spectrum of density fluctuations, etc.
There is a higher probability for us to live in a larger universe because we are a physical
subsystem within the universe with a very small probability pE to have evolved in any Hubble
16
FIG. 3: Third (left) and first person (right) probabilities for the number of efolds Ne of matter
driven inflation in the early universe in the no-boundary quantum state Ψ. The first person
probabilities favor universes with a large amount of inflation because in the larger universes that
result from an extended period of early inflation there are more Hubble volumes for us to be.
volume. In the larger universes that result from an extended period of early inflation there
are more Hubble volumes for us to be. Thus the observer returns to importance in the
probabilities for observing the consequences of inflation.
VIII. ETERNAL INFLATION AND ANTHROPIC SELECTION
We now extend the above model in three crucial ways to arrive, at last, at a realistic
model for the early universe:
(1) Fluctuations: We include fluctuations away from homogeneity and isotropy. These
fluctuations provide the necessary degrees of freedom to describe e.g. the pattern of tem-
perature variations in the CMB. A consequence is that a range of classical histories exhibit
eternal inflation becoming spatially very large and highly inhomogeneous on the largest
scales.
(2) Landscape Potential: We no longer assume one scalar field in a potential with a single
minimum like (7.1). Rather we assume many scalar fields in a multi-field potential that
has many different minima with different directions of approach, as a toy model for the
string landscape [26]. As a consequence the dynamical theory provides a mechanism for the
observable parameters of the histories to vary. Automatic anthropic selection can then be
explicitly illustrated.
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(3) Not Rare but Common: The above assumption that we are rare in all histories is
no longer tenable with eternal inflation. The probability pE for us to exist in any Hubble
volume is very small. Nevertheless, we will be common in a range of histories where the
universe becomes sufficiently large. In that range the connection between third and first
person probabilities will no longer involve volume weighting but instead be given by (4.5).
We now consider the meaning and implications of these extensions in more detail.
1. Eternal Inflation – Histories where Observers are Common
Cosmological perturbation theory extends the homogeneous and isotropic models of Sec-
tion VII straightforwardly to include linear fluctuations away from these symmetries for
each classical history. The early period of slow roll inflation in the classical NBWF histories
stretches and amplifies quantum vacuum fluctuations and generates a pattern of classical
perturbations on scales larger than the horizon, which much later produce the small tem-
perature fluctuations we observe in the microwave sky. However it turns out that very
long-wavelength fluctuations, those which leave the horizon and become classical at values
of φ where
V 3 ≥ |dV/dφ|2 , (8.1)
have a large expected amplitude. There is non-perturbative evidence that histories in which
φ is initially in this regime reach very large (or even infinite) spatial volumes, because these
large very long-wavelength fluctuations tend to make them highly inhomogeneous on scales
much larger than our Hubble volume [22–24]. This dynamical process is known as eternal
inflation [25], and (8.1) defines the regime of field values where eternal inflation occurs.
For quadratic potentials like (7.1), the condition for eternal inflation (8.1) is met for
sufficiently large φ0 > φei where
φei ∼ 1/
√
m, (8.2)
well below the Planck scale φpl ∼ 1/m for realistic values m ∼ 10−5.
Therefore when we include fluctuations the set of classical NBWF histories divides into
two parts: Those with φ0 >∼ φei which are inhomogeneous on the largest scales and have a
great many Hubble volumes N due to eternal inflation, and those with φ0 <∼ φei which are
much smaller and approximately homogeneous.
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This division has significant implications for the first person probabilities for observation.
We are now effectively in the box model case (4.6) where (assuming typicality)
[1− (1− pE)N ] ≈ 1, φ0 > φei, (8.3a)
[1− (1− pE)N ] ≈ pEN  1, φ0 < φei. (8.3b)
Eternally inflating histories are thus strongly selected, whereas histories with slow roll in-
flation only are strongly suppressed by the very small value of pE. In selecting for eternally
inflating universes as the ones we observe, the observer has returned in force.
2. Landscapes — A Mechanism for Cosmological Parameters to Vary
As discussed in Section V, the anthropic selection of observed cosmological parameters
requires a third person theory (I,Ψ) that allows the parameters to vary. Theories with
landscape potentials are a very simple example.
To illustrate what landscape potentials are, consider a third person theory with two scalar
fields φ1 and φ2 moving in a potential V (φ1, φ2). A three dimensional plot of this potential
could be made using φ1 and φ2 as the x− and y−axes and plotting V along the z−axis.
The plot might resemble a mountainous landscape on Earth whence the name ‘landscape
potential’.
Suppose the potential has a number of different minima each surrounded by a number
of different valleys leading to it3. In our past history the fields ‘rolled down’ a particular
valley (‘our’ valley’) to a particular minimum (‘our’ minimum). The value of the potential
at our minimum is the value of the cosmological constant we would observe. The shape of
our valley near our minimum determines the spectrum of density fluctuations in the CMB
we would see. A third person theory that predicts probabilities for which of the possible
histories occurs is thus a starting point for calculating the first person probabilities for the
values of these parameters we observe.
The notion of a landscape potential is easily extended to many scalar fields ~φ so that
V = V (~φ). Assume that each minimum in V (~φ) is surrounded by effectively one-dimensional
valleys. Suppose that these valleys are separated by large barriers so that transitions between
3 Valleys were called ‘channels’ in [9] and other places.
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valleys are negligible. Then we have, in effect, an ensemble of one dimensional potentials
VK(φK) K = 1, 2, · · · — one for each valley.
The NBWF predicts the probabilities for classical inflationary histories for each one-
dimensional potential in this landscape. The total classical ensemble is the union of all these.
An individual history can therefore be labeled by (K,φ0K) where, as explained before, φ0K
is roughly the value of the field φK at the start of its roll down the potential VK . Thus
the NBWF predicts third person probabilities p(K,φ0K) that our universe rolled down the
potential from φ0K in the valley K to its minimum.
Generically a landscape of the kind under discussion contains some valleys K where the
potential VK(φK) has a regime of eternal inflation. Eq. (8.3) implies that histories in these
valleys will dominate the first person probabilities. In the presence of eternal inflation the
first person probabilities are
p(1p)(K,φK0) ≈ p(K,φK0) ≈ exp[3pi/VK(φK0)], φk0 >∼ φKei
≈ 0, φk0 <∼ φKei (8.4)
When the potentials are increasing with field, the most probable NBWF history in a given
valley will be that where the field starts around the exit of eternal inflation, i.e. φK0 = φKei.
Thus, to good approximation, the probability that we rolled down in valley K is
p(1p)(K) ≈ p(K) ≈ exp[3pi/VK(φKei)]. (8.5)
We now apply this result in a concrete model landscape.
3. First person predictions of the No-Boundary State in a landscape model
We now discuss an example of a first person prediction in a landscape model with valleys
where the eternal inflation condition (8.1) is satisfied. This example relates directly to
the historical effort described briefly in Section V to determine the anthropically allowed
ranges of cosmological parameters that are consistent with our existence as observers (see,
e.g.[16, 17, 19, 20]).
Specifically we calculate the NBWF predictions for the first-person probability of a cor-
relation between three observed numbers: First is the observed value of the cosmological
constant Λ ∼ 10−123 (in Planck units). Second is the observed value of the amplitude of
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primordial density fluctuations Q ∼ 10−5 in the CMB. And third is the part of our data Dloc
on the scales of our galaxy and nearby ones which, together with Λ, determine the present
age of the universe t0(Λ, Dloc) ∼ 14Gyr. Thus we are interested in p(1p)(Λ, Q,Dloc) — the
first person probability for this correlation to be observed. Many other such correlations
could be investigated to test a given theory4. But this example will nicely illustrate several
implications of the previous discussion.
We consider a landscape potential in which the parameters Λ and Q vary so the theory
(I,Ψ) will predict probabilities for their values. Specifically we assume a landscape of
different one dimensional valleys with potentials of the form5
VK(φ) = ΛK +
1
2
m2Kφ
2
K , K = 1, 2, · · · . (8.6)
A valley in this landscape is therefore specified by the values (Λ,m). (From now on we will
drop the subscripts K to simplify the notation.)
The NBWF predicts an ensemble of inflationary universes in this landscape. The observed
classical history of our universe rolled down one of the valleys — “our valley”. The values
of Λ and m that characterize our valley can be determined by observation. Measurement of
the expansion history of the universe determines Λ and CMB measurements determine m,
because the amplitude of the primordial temperature fluctuations is given by [8, 15]
Q ≈ N2∗m2. (8.7)
Here N∗ ∼ O(60) is the number of efolds before the end of inflation that the COBE scale
left the horizon during inflation. Observations indicate that Q ∼ 10−5.
The first person probability that we observe specific values of Λ and Q is the first person
probability that our past history rolled down the valley which has those values. Since each
of the valleys (8.6) has a regime of eternal inflation for φ > φei ∼ 1/
√
m the first person
probabilities (8.5) that we observe values of Λ and Q can be written as
p(1p)(Λ, Q) ≈ p(Λ, Q) ∝ exp[3pi/(Λ + c
√
Q/N∗)]. (8.8)
where c ∼ O(1). For fixed Λ this distribution favors small Q. As mentioned above, we
are interested in the joint probability p(1p)(Λ, Q,Dloc) ≈ p(Λ, Q,Dloc) (first equals third in
4 For a recent discussion of observables associated with features of the CMB fluctuations see e.g. [15].
5 For examples of more general landscapes see [27].
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FIG. 4: A contour plot of the fraction f(Λ, Q,Dloc) of baryons in the form of galaxies by the time
t0 ∼ 11Gyr, adapted from the calculation of [19]. As discussed in the text, the fraction is negligible
in the dark (blue) region either because gravitationally bound systems don’t collapse or because
they collapse to black holes.
a regime of eternal inflation). The latter can be rewritten6
p(Λ, Q,Dloc) = p(Dloc|Λ, Q)p(Λ, Q). (8.9)
The second factor in the expression above is given by (8.8). The first will be proportional
to the number of habitable galaxies that have formed in our Hubble volume by the present
age t0(Λ, Dloc). This is plausibly proportional to the fraction of baryons in the form of
galaxies by the present age t0 assuming that is bigger than the collapse time to form a
galaxy. Denoting this by f(Λ, Q, t0) we have from (8.8)
p(1p)(Λ, Q,Dloc) ≈ p(Λ, Q,Dloc) ∝ f(Λ, Q, t0) exp[3pi/(Λ + c
√
Q/N∗)]. (8.10)
6 In traditional anthropic reasoning the first factor in (8.9) is called the ‘selection probability’ which can be
calculated; the second the is the ‘prior’ which is assumed. See, e.g. Eq (1) in [19]. The ‘prior’ is typically
assumed to be uniform in the anthropically allowed range reflecting ignorance of part of the theory. Here
both factors follow from the same theory (I,Ψ) .
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All the quantities in (8.10) are determinable in one Hubble volume — ours. The rest of
the calculation can therefore be carried out in that volume. We don’t need to ask in which of
the vast number of Hubble volumes in the third person eternally inflating universe we dwell.
In this model they are all statistically the same as far as the quantities in (8.10) go. We are
effectively in the situation of the yellow-green box model in Section VI. We can coarse grain
over all other Hubble volumes but ours. In this way we are able to make contact — and use
— calculations in traditional anthropic reasoning.
Figure 4 is a contour plot of f at t0 ∼ 11Gyr — earlier than the present age 14 Gyr because
galaxies have been around for a while. This was adapted from the detailed astrophysical
calculations of [19]. For values of (Λ, Q) to the right of the diagonal dotted line the universe
accelerates too quickly for pre-galactic halos to collapse. Fluctuations have to be large
enough to collapse into galaxies a bit before t0 and produce Dloc. That determines the
bottom boundary. If the fluctuations are too large (top boundary) the bound systems are
mostly large black holes inconsistent with Dloc. The central region where f ≥ .6 is the
anthropically allowed region.
The cosmological constant Λ is negligible compared to Q in the anthropically allowed
(white) region of Figure 4 . The exponential dependence exp [3piN∗/c
√
Q] implied by the
NBWF means that the probabilities (8.10) are sharply confined to the smallest allowed
values consistent with galaxies by t0, i.e. Q ∼ 10−5. The resulting marginal distribution for
Λ is shown in Figure 5 and is peaked about Λ ∼ 10−123 close to the observed value.
However the agreement with observation is not the most important conclusion. The
model is still too simplified for that. What is important is how the example illustrates the
previous discussion. Specifically how anthropic reasoning emerges automatically in quantum
cosmology, how it can be sharpened by a theory of the universes’s quantum state, how first
person probabilities select for large eternally inflating universes, and how what is most
probable to be observed is not necessarily what is most probable to occur — the return of
the observer.
IX. CONCLUSION
Fundamental physical theories have generally been organized into a third person theory
of what occurs and a first person theory of what we observe. In quantum mechanics the
23
FIG. 5: The marginal distribution for the cosmological constant Λ obtained by integrating (8.10)
over Q.
output of the two parts are third person probabilities and first person probabilities. The
character of these two parts, their relative importance, and the relation between them has
changed over time as new data on new scales of observation required new theory and as
the understanding of our observational situation in the universe evolved. The history of
the transitions from classical physics, to Copenhagen quantum mechanics, and then to the
quantum mechanics of closed systems that was briefly sketched in the Introduction is part
of this evolution.
As we discussed in this paper, modern cosmology implies new requirements on both the
the first person theory of what occurs in the universe and the third person theory of what
we observe of the universe.
A third person theory of the whole universe requires a quantum mechanics of closed
systems including quantum spacetime as in [4] for example. It requires a quantum me-
chanics that predicts probabilities for what happens in the early universe when there were
no observers around and no measurements being made. It requires a quantum mechanics
that predicts probabilities for the emergence of classical spacetime in a quantum theory of
gravity. It requires a quantum mechanics that can explain the origin of the rest of classical
predictability in distant realms of the universe that we will never visit.
Quantum cosmology also has implications for first person theory. As observers, individ-
ually and collectively, we are physical systems within the universe with only a probability
to have evolved in any one Hubble volume and, a probability to be replicated in many if the
universe is very large. What we have seen in this essay is that this implies that the observer
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returns to importance in at least the following ways:
• By generally showing that what is most probable to be observed is not necessarily the
most probable to occur.
• By favoring larger universes over small ones if we are rare or if we are common and
thus favoring observations of a significant amount of inflation.
• By making anthropic selection automatic. We won’t observe what is where we cannot
exist.
• By requiring the addition of an assumption of typicality to the theory of what occurs
made concrete by the xerographic distribution — an addition that can be tested and
used to improve prediction.
• By leading to an understanding of how to compute probabilities for our observations
of fundamental constants in a landscape that allows them to vary.
This list is a brief summary of the results of this essay, but these lead naturally to a number
of questions that we discuss here.
A natural question is why the observer wasn’t important in classical cosmology when it
is in quantum cosmology. An answer can be traced to differences in starting points and
objectives. The starting point for classical cosmology was the assumption that the universe
had a single spacetime geometry. The goal was to infer the geometry of that spacetime from
large scale observation. Is it approximately homogeneous and isotropic on large scales, open
or closed... ? What are the values of the cosmological parameters that characterize it — the
cosmological constant, the Hubble constant, the amount of radiation, the amount of baryons,
the amplitude of the density fluctuations, etc? Is there evidence that the spacetime had an
early period of inflation? Observers were presumed to exist but had a negligible influence
on the answers to these questions.
Quantum cosmology does not start by assuming classical spacetime. Rather it starts
from a theory of the universe’s quantum state and dynamics. From that it seeks to explain
when spacetime is classical and predict probabilities for what the different possible classical
spacetimes are — questions that cannot even be asked in the context of classical cosmology.
It therefore answers to the classical questions with probabilities about large scale geometry.
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A second natural question is why are fundamental physical theories encompass both a
third person theory of what occurs and a first person theory of what is observed? The
historical success of theories organized in this way is indisputable. That success tells us
something about the world. It supports the idea of some form of realism, perhaps along the
lines of what Putnam called ‘realism with a human face’ [30]. To paraphrase J. A. Wheeler
‘In a quantum world, the universe is a grand synthesis, putting itself together all the time
as a whole. Its history is ... a totality which includes us and in which what happens now
gives reality to what happened then.’ [29]
A third natural question concerns the scale on which we have to know something of the
universe to make first person predictions. An IGUS7 like us is confined to a very local region
inside of a vast Hubble volume which itself is typically but a small part of a much larger
universe. Yet the present formulation of the first person theory requires information beyond
our Hubble volume to determine whether we are rare, or common, or other. It remains
to be seen whether a more local computation of probabilities for observation in quantum
cosmology can be found. That would be a further way the observer and universe are unified.
Everett’s insight was that, as observers of the universe, we are physical systems within
it, not outside it. We are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics but play no special
role in its formulation. We are negligible perturbations on a third person description of the
universe. But, as shown in this essay in several different ways , we return to importance for
calculating first person probabilities for our observations precisely because we are physical
systems in the universe. We may have only begun to appreciate the ramifications of that
insight.
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Appendix A: Typicality — The Xerographic Distribution
Consider for a moment a third person theory — classical or quantum —that predicts
a large number of Hubble volumes, some with one kind of observable property, some with
another. A box model like those of Section IV with one history and different colored volumes
would be a very simple example.
Suppose that the data D0 that describe our observational situation (including us) occur
in many different Hubble volumes. One of them is ours, but in other volumes the result
of the observation specified by D0 could be different. A third person theory (I,Ψ) would
predict what is observed in all of the instances of D0. But it does not predict which one is
ours. Indeed, it has no notion of ‘we’ or ‘us’.
We don’t know which of these copies of D0 are us. It could be any one of them. To
make first person predictions for our observations, the third person theory must therefore
be augmented by an assumption about which instance of D0 is us, or more generally with
a probability distribution on the set of copies. If there is no such assumption there are no
predictions. Put differently, predictions for our observations require a statement on what
exactly we mean by ‘us’ - a specification of how we think our particular situation relates to
other instances of D0 in the universe.
In the body of this essay we have consistently assumed that we are equally likely to be
any of the incidences of our data D0 that the third person theory (I,Ψ) predicts. This is the
simplest and least informative assumption but it is not the only possible one. Other, more
informative assumptions may lead to better agreement between theory and observation, be
more justified by fact, and be more predictive8.
We call a distribution that gives the probability that we are any of the incidences of D0 or
a subset of it a xerographic distribution [11]. It is usually written ξi where the index ranges
over all incidences of D0. A xerographic distribution is effectively a formal expression of the
assumption about how typical we are in the universe in the set of all other incidences of D0.
It is the theoretical structure consisting of (I,Ψ) and ξ that yields first person predictions
for observation. Each of the elements in this combination is therefore testable by experiment
and observation. Just as we can compete different (I,Ψ) by their predictions for observation
8 As for the Boltzmann brain problem [12]. Boltzmann brains are not a problem if we assume that our
observations are not typical of deluded observers who only imagine that they have the data D0.
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we can also compete different ξ.
Appendix B: The No-Boundary Wave Function in Homogeneous and Isotropic Min-
isuperspace
The example in Section VII assumed the no-boundary wave function (NBWF) for the
quantum state Ψ in the third person theory (I,Ψ) . The NBWF is the analog of the ground
state for closed cosmologies and therefore a natural candidate for the wave function of our
universe. Its predictions for observations are in good agreement with observation. For
example, it predicts that fluctuations away from homogeneity and isotropy start out near
the big bang in their ground state [32]. Combined with its prediction that our universe
underwent an early period of inflation [5] that leads to good agreement with the observed
fluctuations in the CMB. This Appendix provides the reader a little more explanation of
what that wave function is and how its consequences used in the examples are derived. For
more detail see [10].
A quantum state of the universe like the NBWF is represented by a wave function on
a configuration space of three geometries and matter field configurations on a spacelike
surface Σ. On the minisuperspace of homogeneous and isotropic geometries (7.2) and a
single homogeneous scalar field we write
Ψ = Ψ(b, χ). (B1)
Here b is the scale factor of the homogeneous, isotropic metric (7.2) on Σ and χ is the value of
the homogeneous scalar field. The no boundary wave function is a particular wave function
of this form.
The NBWF is formally defined by a sum over homogeneous and isotropic Euclidean
geometries that are regular on a topological four-disk and match b and χ on its boundary
[10], weighted by exp(−I) where I is the Euclidean action of the configurations. We won’t
need to go into this construction. We will only need its leading order in h¯ semiclassical
approximation. That is given by the saddle points (extrema) of the action I[a(τ), φ(τ)] on
this disk for metric coupled to scalar field. There is one dominant saddle point for each
(b, χ). Generally these saddle points will have complex values of both metric and field. The
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semiclassical NBWF is a sum over saddle points terms of the form (in units where h¯ = 1)
Ψ(b, χ) ∝ exp[−I(b, χ)/h¯] ∝ exp [−IR(b, χ) + iS(b, χ)] (B2)
where I(b, χ) is the action evaluated at the saddle point and IR and −S are its real and
imaginary parts.
The wave function (B2) has a standard WKB semiclassical form. As in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, an ensemble of classical histories is predicted in regions of configuration
space where S varies rapidly in comparison with IR. The histories are the integral curves of
S defined by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi relations relating the momenta pb and pχ conjugate
to a and φ to the gradients of S
pb = ∇bS, pχ = ∇χS. (B3)
There is a one parameter family of classical histories — one for each saddle point. It is
convenient to label them by the magnitude of the scalar field φ0 at the center of the saddle
point. One can think crudely of φ0 as the value of the scalar field at which it starts to roll
down to the bottom of the potential in a classical history.
The third person probabilities for these histories are proportional to the absolute square
of the wave function (B2)
p(φ0) ∝ exp[−2IR(φ0)] ≈ exp[−3pi/V (φ0)]. (B4)
The last term is a crude approximation to the action which is useful in rough estimates [18].
This is a very quick summary of a lot of work. For more details see [6]. In short, in the
leading semiclassical approximation the NBWF predicts and ensemble of possible classical
spacetimes obeying (B3) with third person probabilities (7.3).
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